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Abstract: Garrett Cullity concedes that saving a drowning child from a shallow 
pond at little cost to oneself is not actually analogous to giving money to a pov-
erty relief organization like Oxfam. The question then arises whether this objec-
tion is fatal to Peters Singer’s argument for a duty of assistance or whether it 
can be saved anyway. Cullity argues that not saving the drowning child and not 
giving money to organizations like Oxfam are still morally analogous, that is, 
not giving money to organizations like Oxfam is morally nearly as bad as let-
ting the child drown. I argue that Cullity’s two arguments for this conclusion, 
an argument from “transitivity” and an argument from collective responsibility, 
fail.  
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Several authors have correctly pointed out that Singer’s analogy between sav-
ing a drowning child from a shallow pond at little cost to oneself is not actually 
analogous to giving money to a poverty relief organization like Oxfam.1 The 
question then arises whether this objection is fatal to Singer’s argument or 
whether (and perhaps somewhat surprisingly) it can be saved anyway. The most 
sustained and sophisticated attempt to show that it can in fact be saved has been 
made by Garrett Cullity. He contends that the two omissions – not saving the 
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drowning child and not giving money to organizations like Oxfam – are still 
morally analogous, that is, not giving money to organizations like Oxfam is 
morally nearly as bad as letting the child drown or, if not that, at least “the rea-
sons we have for thinking that it can be wrong to let someone die right in front 
of you are equally reasons for thinking that it is wrong to contribute nothing to 
aid agencies in order to address the life-threatening need of people far away.”2 I 
argue that Cullity’s line of reasoning in support of this conclusion is unpersua-
sive. Thus, the shallow pond analogy still fails to establish a duty of assistance 
towards the global poor.  
 
Peter Singer provides the following argument for why we should spend a lot of 
effort in helping the poor: 
1. Premise: “... suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical 
care are bad.” 
2. Premise: “... if it is within our power to prevent something bad from 
happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral im-
portance, we ought, morally, to do it.”  
An alleged application of this principle is: “... if I am walking past a shal-
low pond and see a child drowning in it, I ought to wade in and pull the 
child out. This will mean getting my clothes muddy, but this is insignifi-
cant ...”3 
3. Premise: Not contributing to aid agencies (which help, for example, 
people that are starving) is like not helping the drowning child.4 
Conclusion: “… I and everyone else in similar circumstances ought to 
give as much as possible, that is, at least up to the point at which by giv-
ing more one would begin to cause serious suffering for oneself and one’s 
 
3 
dependents—perhaps even beyond this point to the point of marginal util-
ity, at which by giving more one would cause oneself and one’s depend-
ents as much suffering as one would prevent in Bengal.”5 
Singer claims that the principle stated in the second premise is “uncontrover-
sial,” but later admits that it actually is not. While in his original article on 
“Famine, Affluence, and Morality” he deals with some objections to this second 
premise, he does not mention the fact that many authors have argued that per-
sons may (within certain limits) favor their own interests. For example, the sur-
vival of ten people is arguably morally more important than the survival of one 
person. However, I am not obliged to give my organs away to save ten other 
people. I am entitled to give my own survival precedence (again, within limits). 
Neither Singer nor any other utilitarian, for that matter, provides anywhere an 
even remotely plausible argument for why this common sense conception of 
our moral obligations is mistaken.  
Thus, with his second premise Singer pretty much seems to beg the question. 
However, even if this is granted, and along with it the common sense concep-
tion according to which a person is entitled to favor her own interests within 
certain limits, still the question would arise: what limits? This is why the shal-
low pond analogy is so important: If not contributing to aid agencies is indeed 
analogous to not saving the drowning child, then our moral intuitions with re-
gard to saving it (which, of course, say that we should save it) suggest that we 
are also morally required to contribute to aid agencies – whether or not the 
moral requirement of doing so or the moral requirement of saving the drowning 
child are applications of the dubious (in fact, I think, clearly false) principle in 
Singer’s second premise.6 
So the decisive question is whether the analogy stands. 
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In his article “The Life-Saving Analogy” and his book The Moral Demands of 
Affluence Garrett Cullity examines this question thoroughly and comes to the 
conclusion that the analogy does not stand because 
Singer’s argument by analogy … maintains that an affluent person’s con-
tributions to aid agencies will avert threats to people’s lives. However, 
this claim is false.7 
Cullity adduces two reasons for why it is false. First, most non-government 
agencies are not “providing life-saving aid, but rather preventing the need for it. 
It is not so much saving a drowning person as funding a swimming education 
program.”8 This argument, however, as Cullity makes clear, does not apply to 
genuine famine disaster relief.  
Interestingly, in his later book Cullity claims, as an alleged conclusion of a 
preceding discussion, that 
contributions to aid agencies taken collectively … do avert threats to peo-
ple’s lives. And this means that the life-saving analogy will still remain 
defensible as a claim about our collective action of contributing to aid 
agencies: this is morally analogous to the direct saving of life.9 
However, since Cullity himself makes a distinction between averting or pre-
venting threats to a person’s life on the one hand (he seems to use the two ex-
pressions synonymously here,10 which is not particularly helpful) and saving 
life on the other, averting and preventing threats is clearly not analogous to sav-
ing life.  
Of course, he does not say that it is analogous, he says that it is morally 
analogous – by which he means that not contributing is morally nearly as bad 
as letting the child drown or, if not that, at least “the reasons we have for think-
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ing that it can be wrong to let someone die right in front of you are equally rea-
sons for thinking that it is wrong to contribute nothing to aid agencies in order 
to address the life-threatening need of people far away.”11 Whether this is so, 
however, remains to be seen. That it is so, in any case, can certainly not be es-
tablished with the live-saving analogy itself, since – morally analogous or not – 
it is certainly not analogous to the contribution to aid agencies other than rescue 
agencies.  
Incidentally, all Cullity does, in his reply to the first objection, is to refute 
the following rather silly argument (which, to my knowledge, no serious phi-
losopher has ever made): 
1. Premise: Tackling the causes of poverty is better than merely address-
ing its life-threatening effects and therefore, if anything, we ought to sup-
port long-term development work rather than relief work. 
2. Premise: “But supporting long-term development work, although it 
might be a good thing to do, is not morally required: it is like funding a 
fire safety programme rather than rescuing someone from a fire.” 
Conclusion: “And if supporting development work is preferable to sup-
porting relief work but is not morally required, then supporting relief 
work cannot be morally required either.”12 
However, while Cullity correctly shows that the conclusion clearly does not 
follow from these premises, such a demonstration does not yet show that giving 
to long-term development agencies (whether “collectively” or not) is analogous 
to rescuing a child from drowning or from a fire. To show that would require an 
independent argument, which Cullity does not offer. That is not surprising: after 
all, giving to long-term development agencies is indeed not analogous to rescu-
ing a child from drowning or from a fire. 
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The second objection,13 that is, the second reason why the life-saving anal-
ogy is wrong, also applies to relief or rescue agencies. Cullity calls it the imper-
ceptibility objection:  
[The] extra food bought with my money will not be used to feed one extra 
person. It will be sent to a food distribution camp, and shared among the 
hungry people there. … their each receiving a thousandth of a food ration 
more or less each day will not make much difference.14 
Obviously, in the shallow pond case the passer-by can make a perceptible 
difference, so the two cases are disanalogous. 
Cullity tries to generalize this second objection in the following way: 
If my contributions to an aid agency will not themselves substantially 
help anyone, how can my not making them violate such a right [not to be 
hungry] …?15 
However, the assumption underlying this generalization is, in my view, clearly 
wrong. My not shooting Smith in the head will not help him if ten others are 
shooting him in the head. My not shooting him (or my shooting him, for that 
matter) would not make any difference: he would surely be dead in either case. 
However, it is obvious (under normal circumstances, for there might be certain 
exceptional cases which, however, are not relevant in the present context) that 
from this it does not follow that I would not violate his right to life if I shot him 
in the head while ten others are doing the same.16 To be sure, one might argue 
that this is a case of harming, not of helping; and that if one does not make a 
difference to somebody’s situation one cannot be said to help him. It is not 
completely clear, however, that, conversely, one can say that one is harming 
someone if one does not make a difference to his situation. Still, it might be true 
that the case of omissions is different from the case of positive acts. 
 
7 
Be that as it may, Cullity himself provides two answers to the question as to 
why the individual should contribute to the aid agency even if his contribution 
will not make (much of) a difference. The first, not taken up as clearly in the 
later book, is the argument from transitivity:  
1. Premise: An earmarking agency, that is, one in which “each donation 
is used to buy a particular parcel of food, which is allocated to a particular 
needy individual … would clearly circumvent the imperceptibility objec-
tion …”17 
2. Premise: “… it would be uniquely wrong [that is, it would be the only 
wrong course of action given (only) those two alternatives] to keep one’s 
money to oneself, rather than contributing to an earmarking agency, if 
these were one’s only alternatives.” 
3. Premise: “… it would be uniquely wrong to choose to have earmarking 
agencies rather than nonearmarking ones …”18 To favor an earmarking 
agency is wrong, even “perverse,” according to Cullity, because the 
nonearmarking ones can help more people [call this the efficiency argu-
ment].19 
4. Premise: The relation “‘worse than’ is a paradigm for a transitive rela-
tion,” meaning: if A is worse than B and B is worse than C, then – this is 
transitivity – A must be worse than C.  
Conclusion: “… it must be wrong to keep one’s money to oneself instead 
of contributing to a nonearmarking agency.”20 
And he further concludes:  
“Noncontribution to aid agencies is not a failure to save life. However, I 
have shown that noncontribution remains morally analogous to the failure 
to save life: a Life-Saving Argument remains intact.”21 
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The most natural interpretation of this argument seems to go like this: (a) to 
give nothing is worse than giving to an earmarking agency; (b) to give to an 
earmarking agency is worse than giving to a nonearmarking one; hence, due to 
transitivity: (c) to give nothing is worse than giving to a nonearmarking agency. 
However, with its premise (b) this argument simply begs the question against 
the imperceptibility objection. It is also not the argument Cullity actually 
makes. Rather, his premises and conclusion come with the qualifier “given only 
alternatives A and B”22. Thus, the argument, it seems, would have to be formu-
lated like this: Given only the following two alternatives, to give nothing is 
worse than giving to an earmarking agency; given only the following two alter-
natives, to give to an earmarking agency is worse than giving to a nonearmark-
ing one; hence, due to transitivity: given only the following two alternatives, to 
give nothing is worse than giving to a nonearmarking agency. 
However, firstly, the second premise of this argument still begs the question. 
Secondly, the second premise is also wrong, as I will show in a moment. 
Thirdly, the argument is, moreover, also logically invalid, that is, the conclu-
sion does not follow from the premises. The reason for this is precisely the 
qualifier “given only alternatives A and B.” Transitivity does not work under 
these conditions, at least not without further assumptions, which would need to 
be spelled out and defended. Cullity has since acknowledged this latter point,23 
which is why the transitivity argument no longer plays any important role in his 
book.24 
Incidentally, if this second argument is the one Cullity actually wanted to 
provide,25 he has expressed himself very misleadingly. After all, in premise (3) 
he talks about choosing to have earmarking agencies rather than nonearmarking 
ones, not about giving to earmarking agencies. But then the actual argument 
 
9 
seems to be this one: Given only the following two alternatives, to give nothing 
is worse than giving to an earmarking agency; given only the following two 
alternatives, to give to an earmarking agency is worse than choosing to have a 
nonearmarking one; hence, due to transitivity: given only the following two 
alternatives, to give nothing is worse than choosing to have a nonearmarking 
agency. 
Yet, this argument is wrong for the reasons the second argument (the one 
with the qualifier about given alternatives) is wrong too. It is also wrong for 
additional reasons and, in addition, completely misses the point it officially 
targets. 
First, giving to an earmarking agency is not worse than choosing to have a 
nonearmarking one. By choosing to have certain agencies I have not yet con-
tributed anything to their functioning; in particular, I have not yet given them 
any money with which to help anyone. Actually giving to an earmarking agency 
is therefore the better course of action. Second, even if the conclusion were 
correct (which, for the reason just stated, it is not) that giving nothing is worse 
than choosing to have a nonearmarking agency, it would nevertheless be irrele-
vant. (Incidentally, the relevant conclusion “To give nothing is worse than giv-
ing to a nonearmarking agency” would obviously not even follow if we deleted 
the qualifiers “given only these two alternatives.”) The question is whether giv-
ing nothing is worse than giving to a nonearmarking agency. And finally, and 
most importantly, even if that were worse, it certainly does not demonstrate that 
“noncontribution remains morally analogous to the failure to save life.” Spit-
ting in someone’s face might be worse than spitting at his shoes, but that does 
not show that spitting in someone’s face is like letting a child drown in a shal-
low pond. 
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After all, the issue is the analogy with saving life. But then talking unspecifi-
cally about earmarking agencies that help needy people is not quite enough. 
Rather, we have to consider earmarking agencies that help people whose life is 
in immediate danger, that is, for example, who are drowning right now. We 
have to consider life-saving agencies. And, further, we have to consider, not 
“having” them, but contributing to them. 
Once we do that, however, we get a completely different picture than the one 
suggested by the transitivity argument. In fact, Cullity himself admits: 
If you could either easily rescue someone from a fire or fund a fire safety 
programme, then obviously it would be wrong to do nothing. But, more 
than that, surely a stronger claim is obvious: it would be wrong not to res-
cue the person. It would be perverse in such a situation to let the person 
die and fund a safety programme instead.26 
Yes, it would. But then, obviously, the third premise of the transitivity ar-
gument (the second in my interpretations), if it is interpreted in a way that is 
relevant to the question, namely in a way that makes it a premise about contrib-
uting to agencies, not about “having” them, is mistaken if applied to life-saving 
agencies. Ironically, Cullity’s earlier claim about perversion is perverse accord-
ing to his own later insight. It follows that so far he has failed to establish a 
“moral analogy” between not contributing to aid agencies and letting the child 
in the shallow pond die. 
 
Cullity has a second reply to the imperceptibility objection. This second reply 
appeals to the notion of collective responsibility. Let me already note here, 
somewhat mischievously perhaps, but also quite realistically, that once you try 
to save the shallow pond analogy with an appeal to collective responsibility, the 
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clear lake has been exchanged for extraordinarily muddy waters, as it were, and 
all the simplistic beauty of Singer’s original argument has gone for good. Now 
it is no longer the child who is downing, but the theorist of a duty to assist – at 
the very least, he is up to the neck in it. 
But let us have a closer look. Cullity’s argument goes like this, using now a 
different analogy: 
If someone is drowning in front of you and me, and can be rescued only 
by using a winch mechanism that requires two people to operate, then it is 
obvious that we are morally required to help him ... Why? Because he 
desperately needs this help, and we could provide it at small cost to our-
selves. The explanation of the requirement of beneficence is the same as 
before: the only difference is that the subject of the requirement is the two 
of us collectively, rather than one person individually. The reasons for 
imposing requirements of beneficence on individuals clearly apply 
equally to groups. 
This is not yet a reply to someone who emphasizes the insignificant ef-
fect of my contributions to aid agencies. But it is a claim that someone 
with this view cannot sensibly oppose. Clearly, our collective actions can 
have a significant effect in helping other people; and this is the basis of 
collective requirements to do so … 
Given this, the [imperceptibility] objection will have to take the fol-
lowing form. The wrongness of a collective action does not entail the 
wrongness of the actions of any member of the group that is collectively 
acting wrongly.27 
Cullity actually accepts that this last sentence is right in principle, but claims 
that in the winch version of the shallow pond example failing to contribute is 
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wrong anyway. To wit, his reply to the objection in this form is “that failing to 
contribute towards meeting the collective moral requirements is unfair” of the 
individual.28 
Before moving on, let us take stock here. One of the first things to say about 
the argument so far is that it certainly does not show that not contributing to the 
aid agency is “morally analogous” to not saving a drowning child. It only 
shows that there are significant moral disanalogies.  
After all, what supposedly happens in the original shallow pond example is 
that a person in a fancy suit lets a poor, helpless child drown in order not to 
muddy his cloths. Thus, by not helping the child he is violating an important 
duty of beneficence towards the child or violates its right to life. In Cullity’s 
collective version of the example, however, a person in a fancy suit is only vio-
lating a clearly much less important duty of fairness towards, perhaps, another 
person in a fancy suit. He violates no duty towards persons in need of being 
helped or rescued at all. At best the group does. 
Interestingly (and inconsistently), while Cullity insists that he has “not re-
placed an argument from beneficence with an argument from fairness”29, he 
actually acknowledges both disanalogies (individual vs. group responsibility 
and duty of beneficence vs. duty of fairness) – though he does not draw the cor-
rect conclusion, namely that the live-saving analogy is by now out of the pic-
ture. Regarding the beneficence/fairness distinction he clearly states: 
… I have maintained that we stand under a collective moral requirement 
of beneficence to help needy people through aid agencies, and there is an 
individual moral requirement of fairness upon each of us to contribute 
towards meeting that collective requirement.30 
As regards the second disanalogy, namely that the individual duty to save 
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you is a more important duty than the individual duty of fairness to contribute 
to a collective effort to save you, he no less clearly states that “the direct reason 
of beneficence for rescuing you … overrides the reason of fairness for contrib-
uting to the collective action.”31 Or to repeat a quote I have already adduced 
above: 
If you could either easily rescue someone from a fire or fund a fire safety 
programme, then obviously it would be wrong to do nothing. But, more 
than that, surely a stronger claim is obvious: it would be wrong not to res-
cue the person. It would be perverse in such a situation to let the person 
die and fund a safety programme instead.32 
Thus, individually not contributing to an aid agency is clearly and definitely 
not “morally analogous” to not saving a drowning child or a child in immediate 
danger of being burnt in a fire – and this is confirmed by Cullity’s very own 
observations. There is still no sight of any relevant analogy.  
 
However, Cullity’s argument from fairness could still succeed in showing that 
the individual has a duty to contribute, namely a (weak) duty of fairness. Does 
it? 
No, it does not. Let us go back to Cullity’s statement that one “cannot sensi-
bly oppose” that the “reasons for imposing requirements of beneficence on in-
dividuals clearly apply equally to groups.” Actually, the question here is not at 
all what requirements one can “impose” on someone, but what moral require-
ments someone (or something) actually has. And the reasons why groups are 
not subject to any moral requirements is the same as the reason why tomatoes 
or stones are not subject to such requirements: tomatoes, stones and groups are 
not morally responsible agents; in particular, they cannot think. 
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Of course, it is perfectly fine to say that a group has decided this or done that 
if this is understood as simply shorthand for saying that the individuals who 
constitute the group have made certain decisions. But if this is not what is 
meant, it is not entirely clear to me what is meant. For example, if by saying 
that the subject of the requirement is the two of us collectively Cullity only 
means to say, in this case, that we both have an obligation to cooperate with 
each other to save the drowning person, then I have not many qualms with it 
(for now, that is). At least it is an assertion I understand. However, if this is not 
what he means, I have to reject his claim as unintelligible. At least he would 
have to explain what exactly it is what he means. 
On my understanding, incidentally, the duty of each of the two persons to 
co-operate with the other one (leaving libertarian objections aside for the mo-
ment) is not a duty of fairness owed to that other potential helper but rather one 
owed to the drowning person. Thus, my understanding of the claim about “col-
lective” responsibility is certainly closer to Singer’s original example than Cul-
lity’s. 
Thus, I quite simply, and quite reasonably at that, reject the claim that we 
can first identify a moral duty of a collective to do something and then simply 
“fairly distribute” that duty among the individual members of the collective. 
This tactic does not succeed for the simple reason that collectives do not have 
moral duties (which, by the way, does not exclude the possibility of justifiably 
assigning or imposing upon them certain behavioral duties, or of blaming 
them33). 
 
But let us set these very fundamental objections aside for the sake of argument 
and return to the fairness argument. 
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It is somewhat ironic that in the light of Cullity’s own averments about the 
duty of fairness, the obligations of the agents in the winch example cannot have 
anything to do with such a duty. After all, according to Cullity the unfairness he 
is talking about consists in the free rider’s “arrogating privileges to herself” in 
that 
… she relies on others to contribute to what we ought collectively to be 
doing, without contributing herself. … That collective imperative is being 
met, but she is leaving the work of meeting it to others.34 
However, in the winch example she cannot do anything of that sort. After 
all, ex hypothesi the winch can only be successfully operated with her help. At 
least if she knows that, she cannot “rely” on others to do the job, and even if she 
does not know that, the collective imperative will not be met if she does not 
help, too. My own explanation of the winch situation, in contrast, does not face 
any such problems. 
A better example for Cullity’s purposes, provided by himself, then, might be 
the following one: 
There are three people drowning, and three bystanders, including me. We 
can rescue them, but only by using a winch mechanism that can be oper-
ated by a minimum of two people or, more easily, by three. Two things 
seem obvious here. First, we should winch them out. … [Second:] Even if 
the other two bystanders could operate the winch and save all the drown-
ing people by working harder without me, I should not simply leave the 
job to them.35 
What is actually obvious here, however, is that what Cullity claims to be ob-
vious isn’t obvious at all. If I pass by and see that the two bystanders have eve-
rything under control, are even singing a merry tune while operating the winch, 
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why should I not just attend to my own affairs? Even if they want me to help – 
people might want a lot of things, but that does not mean that I act unfairly in 
not giving it to them. After all, I am not needed here. Similarly, am I really un-
fair when I desist from helping three rescue swimmers who are already jumping 
into the water to save the drowning child and who, due to the fact that I am just 
watching or moving on, will reach the shore two nanoseconds later than they 
would have had with my help? To answer “yes” defies common sense. 
Even if it were, however, unfair, strictly speaking, it would hardly be worth 
mentioning. And it might not even be immoral, not even strictly speaking. If I 
can save someone from a dire fate only by cheating while I am playing chess 
with a friend, then this unfairness would certainly wrong my friend, but it 
wrongs him justifiably. It seems, however – even without necessarily sharing 
Bernard Williams’ ideas about Gauguin – that I might well be morally justified 
in inflicting a “microwrong” on a person if I thereby bestow a considerable 
benefit on a person I especially care for (like myself). After all, the reason why 
a permission not to save the drowning child in the shallow pond example is 
counterintuitive is that the little benefit to myself of not helping is completely 
outweighed by the dramatic harm to the child. However, the benefit of arriving 
on time at the cinema and watching the movie I was looking forward to is cer-
tainly not clearly outweighed by the fact that then the rescue swimmers will 
reach the shore a nanosecond later or by the fact that the people at the winch 
will burn a nanocalorie more. The shallow pond analogy is drowning for good 
reasons.36 
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